An extensive empirical literature in strategy and …nance studies the performance implications of corporate diversi…cation. Two core debates in the literature concern the existence of a diversi…cation discount and the relative importance of industry relatedness and market structure for the performance of diversi…ers. We address these debates by building a formal model in which the extent of diversi…cation is endogenous and depends on the degree of industry relatedness. Firms' diversi…cation choices a¤ect both their own competitiveness and market structure. We …nd a non-monotonic e¤ect of relatedness on performance: while greater relatedness increases the competitiveness of diversi…ed …rms, it can also spur additional diversi…cation, thereby eroding market structure and performance. In addition, our model elucidates the emergence of heterogeneity in …rm scope strategies. We use the model to generate data and show how the negative e¤ect of relatedness on market structure can give rise to spurious inference of a diversi…cation discount in cross-sectional regressions.
Introduction
A fundamental question in corporate strategy is the choice of horizontal scope -the set of industries and market segments in which a …rm competes. Governing this choice is a trade-o¤ between the threat of losing focus and the opportunity to grow and exploit synergies. This trade-o¤ raises the question of whether and when diversi…cation is pro…table. Understanding the drivers of successful diversi…cation has been a pillar of the strategy research agenda from the founding of the …eld (e.g. Penrose, 1959; Anso¤, 1957) .
In this paper, we seek to elucidate the relationship between diversi…cation and performance by developing a formal model in which diversi…cation decisions are endogenous. In so doing, we contribute to the growing literature on the formal foundations of strategy, which has so far largely ignored issues of corporate strategy. Prior work on the formal foundations of strategy has focused on the general issue of value creation and value capture (Brandenberger and Stuart, 1996; Lippman and Rumelt, 2003; MacDonald and Ryall, 2004) , the workings of strategic factor markets in which …rms acquire valuable resources (Makadok, 2001; Makadok and Barney, 2001 ) and on the sustainability of competitive advantage at the business unit level (Adner and Zemsky, 2006) . Given the extensive attention paid to corporate level issues in the strategy …eld, we think that extending formal work into the realm of corporate strategy is a natural and important next step.
Empirical work on the relationship between performance and diversi…cation has a long history in both the strategy literature (e.g., see Ramanujam and Varadarajan, 1989 ; and Montgomery, 1994 for reviews) and in the …nance literature (e.g., see Martin and Sayrak, 2003 for a review). Work in …nance, in particular, has centered on a debate between two competing views of diversi…ed …rms. One view is that diversi…ed …rms are able to exploit superior information to make better resource allocation choices through their internal capital markets than could …nancial markets (Caves, 1971; Myers and Majluf, 1984) . A competing view is that diversi…ed …rms are plagued by ine¢ciencies due to agency problems and that resources would be better allocated between businesses by …nancial markets (Amihud and Lev, 1981 ; Schliefer and Vishney 1989). The observation that diversi…ed …rms trade at a discount to their more focused peers is taken as evidence of unresolved agency problems and poor corporate governance. Numerous studies have supported the existence of such a diversi…cation discount (e.g., Montgomery and Wernerfelt, 1988; Lang and Stulz, 1994; Berger and Ofek, 1995) .
The strategy literature, with its fundamental concern with …rm heterogeneity, has had a di¤erent focus. It has sought to explain di¤erences in performance among diversi…ed …rms.
Early contributions focused on the extent to which relatedness among corporate businesses was associated with higher returns (Rumelt, 1974; Bettis, 1981) . Later contributions sought to link the nature of …rm resources with the type of diversi…cation in which …rms engaged (Montgomery and Wernerfelt, 1988; Chatterjee and Wernerfelt, 1991) . The basic notion, going back to Penrose (1959) , is that the greater the relatedness among the markets within which the …rm competes, the greater the scope for sharing resources across business units and hence the greater the performance of diversi…ed …rms. Competing with this internal, resource-based perspective on diversi…cation performance, is a research stream that emphasizes the importance of external competitive pressures, speci…cally the importance of industry attractiveness and market structure (Christensen and Montgomery, 1981; Montgomery, 1985) and the potential to manage competition through multi-market contact (Karnani and Wernerfelt, 1985; Gimeno and Woo, 1999) .
In both strategy and …nance, early empirical work took the decision to diversify as exogenous. More recent empirical contributions have explicitly incorporated the endogeneity of the diversi…cation decision. Several papers use empirical methods (e.g. Heckman, 1979; Deheja and Wahba, 2001 ) that control for endogeneity by explicitly allowing for the possibility that underlying di¤erences among …rms a¤ect both …rm performance and the decision to diversify (Campa and Kedia, 2002; Villelonga, 2004a Villelonga, , 2004b Graham et al., 2002) . These papers suggest that diversi…ers are di¤erent from non diversi…ers. When researchers control for these di¤erences, they fail to …nd a diversi…cation discount, and in some cases, they …nd a diversi…cation premium. In other words, they argue that weaker …rms are inherently more likely to diversify, and that it is this underlying weakness that is responsible for their low performance, rather than their diversi…cation strategy per se. The debate, however, is not yet settled (see for example the round-table discussion in Villelonga, 2003) .
In parallel to these empirical studies, several theoretical papers in …nance have modeled the diversi…cation decisions of …rms. Borrowing from the strategy literature, these papers usually start with a set of …rms that vary in their capabilities. They then examine the diversi…cation decisions of individual …rms in isolation from their peers. In Maksimovic and Phillips (2002) and in Gomes and Livdan (2004) …rms with high productivity specialize in a single industry while those with lower productivity chose to diversify. In Matsusaka (2001) and in Bernardo and Chowdhry (2002) …rms choose to engage in costly diversi…cation as a way to search for new opportunities to leverage their capabilities. Consistent with the recent empirical …ndings, all of these theories predict a spurious diversi…cation discount. That they obtain these results with rational, pro…t maximizing …rms calls into question prior claims about the pervasiveness of agency problems in corporate strategy (Jensen, 1986) .
In contrast with the recent …nance literature, which has focused almost exclusively on the impact of …rm heterogeneity, the strategy literature on diversi…cation has emphasized three distinct drivers of diversi…cation performance: …rm heterogeneity, industry relatedness and the extent of competitive pressures. Clearly, each of these drivers of pro…tability should impact the decision to diversify. The received theory, with its exclusive focus on the decision of isolated …rms, has overlooked the e¤ects of competitive interactions. Recent empirical studies in strategy (Stern and Henderson, 2004 , examining the US personal computer industry;
Bowen and Wiersema, 2005, examining the entry of foreign-based rivals) have begun to explicitly link competition and endogenous diversi…cation decisions. We hope that further theory development can help to guide future empirical work. 1 We contribute to the received literature by developing a formal model of diversi…cation decisions by multiple competing …rms that simultaneously considers industry relatedness and market structure. The main elements of our model are as follows. There are two industries and …rms have a choice between a specialist strategy, which involves competing in only one industry, and a diversi…cation strategy, which involves competing in both industries and incurring additional …xed costs. We allow …rms to vary in their competitiveness, either due to di¤erences in marginal costs or due to di¤erences in consumer willingness to pay for their offer. The degree of industry relatedness determines whether diversi…cation has a positive e¤ect on …rm competitiveness ("synergies") or a negative e¤ect ("loss of focus"). Market structure depends on the number of rivals in each industry and on their competitiveness.
We decompose the decision to diversify into three elements: the …xed cost associated with diversi…cation ( ), the revenue growth from entry into the second industry (), and the e¤ect on revenues in the home industry due to shifts in competitiveness (). A …rm chooses to diversify when the additional …xed cost burden is less than the net increase in revenue
A key building block in the analysis is the e¤ect of relatedness on the decision to diversify. Increased relatedness between the industries has two e¤ects. First, increased relatedness creates more opportunities to share …xed costs across businesses, which lowers the …xed cost burden associated with diversi…cation. Second, increased relatedness enhances the competitiveness of diversi…ed …rms relative to specialized …rms by creating more opportunities at the corporate level to reduce marginal costs or increase consumer willingness to pay. Increased competitiveness increases revenues in both the home market and the target market. Hence, increased relatedness makes it more likely that diversi…cation is pro…table. Now consider the impact of increases in relatedness on performance. Holding …xed the number of diversi…ed and specialized …rms, the pro…ts of diversi…ed …rms increase with relatedness. At the same time, the pro…ts of specialized …rms decrease due to the increased competitiveness of their diversi…ed rivals. However, this does not account for the endogeniety of diversi…cation decisions. With su¢cient increases in relatedness, …rms that would have previously chosen to specialize now choose to diversify and enter a second industry. This deterioration in market structure lowers the pro…ts of both diversi…ers and specialists. Thus, while the e¤ect of increased relatedness on the pro…ts of specialized …rms is unambiguously negative, the e¤ect on diversi…ed …rms is non-monotonic. Overall, however, as relatedness increases from a low level up to a high level we …nd that the pro…ts of all …rms fall.
In many industries one observes di¤erences in …rm scope strategies. For example, automakers vary in the range of vehicles they produce and the geographies that they serve; some information technology …rms like IBM and HP pursue broad strategies while other like SAP and Sun Microsystems pursue more focused strategies. The resource-based view of strategy explains such di¤erences in product market positions with di¤erences in the underlying resource-base of the …rms (Wernerfelt, 1984) .
Our theory explains …rm heterogeneity in scope strategy even though all …rms are initially the same. While one might expect that, absent resource heteroegneity, either all …rms would chose to diversify or none would, we show that this need not be the case. Rather, we show that the number of diversi…ed …rms increases incrementally with increases in the degree of market relatedness. The level of diversi…cation increases incrementally in our model because each new diversi…er increases competition and this lowers the returns from additional diversi…cation.
Hence, not all …rms will …nd it pro…table to bear the …xed costs of diversifying. The more related are the two industries, the greater the returns to diversi…cation and the greater the number of …rms that choose to diversify. Because diversi…cation strategy a¤ects competitiveness, the di¤erences in …rm scope strategies give rise to heterogeneity in market shares and pro…ts.
In our model, diversi…cation can either enhance or reduce the competitiveness of diversi…ers relative to specialists. We show that …rms may rationally diversify even in the case where diversi…cation decreases their competitiveness, thus lowering their revenues in the home market, because of o¤setting revenue growth in the new market. We consider how outcomes depend on whether diversi…cation increases or decreases competitiveness. When competitiveness decreases, we …nd that either specialists or diversi…ers can have higher pro…ts, depending on the level of relatedness. We also …nd that …rms face a coordination problem in that there may be multiple possible levels of diversi…cations. This is because diversi…cation by a given …rm weakens it in its home market, which can, in turn, induce another …rm to diversify to exploit this weakness. In contrast, when competitiveness increases with diversi…cation, we …nd that the pro…ts of diversi…ed …rms are always higher than those of specialists and that there is a unique level of diversi…cation for a given level of relatedness.
To make explicit the implications of our theory for empirical work on the diversi…cation discount we use our model to generate cross-sectional data. We analyze the data with di¤erent OLS regression models. The data are composed of …fty industry pairs that vary in their degree of relatedness. Within each pair, there are four …rms, which behave according to our theoretical model. We focus on parameters such that diversi…ers have higher pro…ts than specialists within any given industry pair. However, industry pairs with more diversi…ed …rms (due to higher levels of relatedness) tend to have lower pro…ts due to increased competitive pressures.
We show that a spurious inference of a diversi…cation discount can arise. This occurs with empirical speci…cations that do not include e¤ective controls for industry relatedness. We show that controlling for relatedness will correctly identify the underlying diversi…cation premium, but that, absent controls for market structure, the regression analysis will lead to incorrect inference regarding the e¤ect of industry relatedness.
As in any formal modeling exercise, we have had to make important simplifying assumptions. These assumption contribute to the model's tractability and make the mechanisms underlying the results more transparent. First, we assume that the two industries are symmetric in terms of demand and cost conditions. Second, we assume that …rms are initially homogeneous (but we do show how heterogeneity emerges from …rms' diversi…cation choices).
Third, we take the number of …rms as exogenous, which means that we can not address issues of entry and exit or of mergers and acquisitions. However, our model is highly tractable, and as we discuss in the conclusion, all of these simpli…cations are potential avenues for further developing a formal theory of corporate strategy.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the model. Section 3 considers the benchmark where diversi…cation decisions are exogenous. Section 4 characterizes the drivers of a …rm's diversi…cation decision and then Section 5 characterizes how the equilibrium level of diversi…cation varies with market relatedness. Section 6 considers the relative pro…tability of specialized and diversi…ed …rms. Section 7 presents the analysis of the simulated data and Section 8 contains a concluding discussion.
The Model
We develop a simple, formal model. There are two markets which we label  and . These could be entirely di¤erent industries or they could be two market segments within a single industry. We assume that the two markets have the same underlying attractiveness including the same number of potential buyers, . The actual attractiveness and realized size of each market will, however, vary with the number of …rms that enter. There are   1 …rms that are initially identical. Firm heterogeneity arises from di¤erences in their choice of scope strategy. We follow the standard approach in studying two-stage games of focusing on subgame perfect equilibria, which rules out equilibria that can only be supported by non-credible threats.
In addition, we focus on pure strategy equilibria so that …rms are not randomly choosing their scope strategies.
Stage I: The E¤ects of Diversi…cation
A …rm's choice of scope in stage I a¤ects both its …xed costs and its competitiveness. The degree of relatedness between the two markets determines exactly how …xed costs and competitiveness are impacted by the decision to diversify.
Firms incur a …xed cost of¸0 when they diversify and enter both markets. represents the additional …xed costs required for entry into the second industry, such as new product design, advertising and qualifying new suppliers. The more related are the two industriesthe more they share technologies and customers -the lower is .
A …rm's competitiveness in a market is the level of value that it creates with its product and service o¤ering. Value creation is the gap between consumers' willingness to pay for the …rm's o¤er and the …rm's marginal cost of production (Brandenberger and Stuart, 1996). We let   be an index of …rm 's value creation for a consumer in market . A …rm's horizontal scope strategy determines its value creation as follows. Firms specialized in market  have
where   is the value creation of specialized …rms in their home market. Diversi…ed …rms have
where   is the value creation of diversi…ed …rms.
We make no restriction on the whether   or   is larger. Let  =     be the competitiveness of diversi…ed …rms relative to specialized …rms. The case of   1 corresponds to diseconomies of scope where diversi…ed …rms are less competitive than specialized …rms, which could result, for example, from a loss of focus. The case of   1 corresponds to synergies where diversi…ed …rms are more competitive than specialized …rms, which could result, for example, from the ability to better utilize production capacity or to o¤er customers the convenience of a "one-stop-shop". The more related are the two markets in terms of shared technologies and customers the greater is .
While we make no restriction on whether  is greater or less than one, we simplify the analysis by restricting the range of its possible values to assure that no …rm has such low competitiveness that it is forced out of a market. Speci…cally we assume that
For example, with four …rms we have that 133    0625. 2 In summary, our model follows the strategy literature in viewing industry relatedness as a key mediating construct in determining the e¤ect of diversi…cation. Greater relatedness results in both a decrease in the …xed costs of diversifying ( ) and an increase in the relative competitiveness of diversi…ed …rms ().
Stage II: The Outcome of Competition
One challenge with two-stage games is the need to specify the nature of competition in the second stage. There are a wide range of possible models of market competition including
Hotelling models of horizontal di¤erentiation, Cournot models of quantity competition with homogeneous products, and models of price competition with vertically di¤erentiated products.
In this paper we use Cournot competition with linear demand and heterogenous …rms to model competitive interactions among the …rms in stage II. For our study, the advantage of a Cournot speci…cation is that competitive pressures are moderate. Thus, a …rm can earn some pro…ts even if it is not the most e¢cient …rm in the market. This is important because we want to allow for the possibility that …rms diversify even when there are diseconomies of scope (i.e.
  1). Moreover, we want to allow for pro…ts to decline gradually as more …rms pursue a given scope strategy. A Cournot model with linear demand is the simplest model that delivers these properties.
As detailed in Appendix I, Cournot pro…ts can be expressed as a function of the value creation of the …rms competing in a market. Speci…cally, the pro…ts of …rm  in market  depend on the number of rivals in the market ( ), the …rm's value creation for a consumer in the market (  ), its value creation relative to each of its rivals (
, and the size of the market ():
Note two key properties of the Cournot pro…t function (2.2). First, pro…ts are falling in the number of competitors  . Second, pro…ts depend on both absolute value creation (  ) and
, which is what makes it possible for moderately ine¢cient 2 See Appendix I for a derivation of condition (2.1).
…rms to still produce and earn some pro…ts.
Substituting   and   into (2.2), the pro…t of a specialized …rm is given by
where   is the number of other …rms specializing in the same market and   is the number of diversi…ers. The pro…t of a diversi…ed …rm, which is active in two markets and must incur the …xed cost , is
Exogenous Diversi…cation
We start the analysis by considering a baseline case where …rm scope strategies are exogenous.
We take as given the number of …rms   ,   and   pursuing each strategy and characterize the e¤ect of changes in relatedness on the pro…ts of diversi…ed and specialized …rms. The analysis is straight forward.
Recall that industry relatedness a¤ects both the …xed costs and competitiveness  =     . The pro…ts of specialized …rms   are given by (2.3) . This is independent of the …xed costs associated with diversi…cation . To see the e¤ect of  we can rewrite (2.3) as
which is falling in the competitiveness of diversi…ed …rms. As one would expect, the more competitive are diversi…ed …rms, the lower the pro…ts of specialists.
Now consider the pro…ts of diversi…ed …rms   as given by (2.4), which we can rewrite as
which is decreasing in and increasing in . The greater the additional …xed cost of diversi…-cation, the lower the pro…ts of diversi…ed …rms; the greater the competitiveness of diversi…ers, the higher their pro…ts. Thus we have the following: As for the relative pro…ts of specialists and diversi…ers, there are too many degrees of freedom to make any prediction. For su¢ciently high,      , while for ¸1 and
A central objective of this paper is to understand how the e¤ect of relatedness on the absolute and relative performance of specialists and diversi…ers changes when one accounts for the endogeneity of …rm scope strategies.
The Decision to Diversify
A useful …rst step towards endogenizing …rm scope is to examine the incentives for a single …rm to choose to diversify, holding …xed the scope strategies of the other …rms. Three key elements that shape a …rm's decision to diversify, which we label  ,  and .
Consider a situation where there are  ¸1 …rms specialized in market , one of which is considering whether or not to diversify. This focal …rm increases its pro…ts by diversifying if and only if
We can use (3.1) and (3.2) to rewrite (4.1) as
where  is the increase in …xed costs required to diversify into market  relative to the market size,  is the increase in pro…ts coming from growth in market , and  is the change in pro…ts in the home market . Speci…cally, we have that
and what matters is the extent of …xed costs relative to market size, where the relevant measure of market size depends on the number of consumers () and the value created for
The growth in pro…ts from entry into the target market  is
which is positive and increasing in  the competitiveness of diversi…ers. 4 Finally, the e¤ect of diversi…cation on pro…ts in the home market  is
 is increasing in  and for  = 1 we have  = 0. Thus for   1 we have that   0 and the e¤ect on the home market serves to discourage diversi…cation. For   1 we have that   0 and the e¤ect in the home market encourages diversi…cation.
A widely cited managerial prescription for making diversi…cation decisions is to consider
Porter's three tests (Porter, 1987) : the cost-of-entry test, the better-o¤ test and the attractiveness test. A bene…t of our formal treatment is that it clari…es some of the ways in which the factors highlighted in the three tests interact with each other in determining the desirability of diversi…cation. Our    +  formula overlaps with Porter's tests as follows. The quantity  captures the cost of entry, as well as including the impact of market size, which is a key component of industry attractiveness. The better-o¤ test concerns the e¤ect of diversi…cation on competitiveness in the target and the existing business, which we capture with . A key component of the industry attractiveness test is market structure, which in our model is given by the number of specialized (  ,   ) and diversi…ed (  ) rivals. Our terms  and  are determined by the interaction of competitiveness () with market structure (  ,   and   ).
While  and  are exogenous to the model,  and  depend on   ,   and   and hence on the choices of the other …rms. The next section disentangles this strategic interdependence and characterizes the equilibrium level of diversi…cation.
The Level of Diversi…cation
We now characterize the equilibrium level of diversi…cation and how it varies with the extent of market relatedness. We also consider whether there is a unique equilibrium level of diversi…-cation or whether strategic interdependencies create multiple possible levels of diversi…cation.
Why is multiplicity more than a technical matter? Consider how the sentiment towards diversi…cation has varied over time, from the 1960s, when diversi…cation was regarded with favor, to the 1980s, when it was regarded with suspicion (Schliefer and Vishny, 1991). The existence of multiple equilibria matters because it means that coordination among …rms matters. It means external in ‡uences, such as popular sentiment towards diversi…cation, can shift behavior, even with pro…t maximizing …rms.
The decision of a single …rm to diversify as characterized in Section 4 can be expressed in terms of just two exogenous parameters, namely  and  . We focus the analysis and exposition on these two parameters, which both vary with industry relatedness.
We begin the analysis with some technical preliminaries, which established two key properties. First, specialized …rms spread out as evenly as possible between the two markets in order to minimize competitive pressures. The implication is that identifying the equilibrium number of diversi…ers is su¢cient for characterizing the equilibrium outcome. Second, an equilibrium must satisfy a pair of conditions similar to (4.1), which jointly de…ne a range of  values.
Technical Preliminaries
Denote by  ¤  ,  ¤  and  ¤  the equilibrium number of …rms pursuing each diversi…cation strategy. In principle, the number of possible equilibria increases exponentially in the total number of …rms, . The number of diversi…ers  ¤  can take values from 0 to  and then for each value of  ¤  the remaining …rms can be divided among  specialists and  specialists in  ¡  ¤  + 1 di¤erent ways. Fortunately, the following lemma greatly simpli…es the analysis.
Lemma 5.1. The specialist …rms spread themselves as evenly as possible across the two markets so that the di¤erence is at most one (i.e., j
Pro…ts in each market are falling in the number of competitors. There cannot be an equilibrium where the di¤erence in the number of specialists …rm is greater than one, because a …rm from the more crowded market would increase its pro…ts by specializing in the less crowded market. Hence, given a value of  ¤  there is essentially only one possibility for the con…guration of the specialist …rms. 5 The number of possible equilibria is then linear in .
Thus we have simpli…ed the analysis of the model so that we only need to characterize how the equilibrium level of diversi…cation  ¤  depends on the level of market relatedness as re ‡ected in  and  . We now identify the two conditions that an equilibrium level of diversi…cation must satisfy.
Lemma 5.2. Necessary and su¢cient conditions for 0   ¤    to be an equilibrium level
The necessary and su¢cient condition for  ¤  =  to be an equilibrium is
3)
The necessary and su¢cient condition for
Condition (5.1) assures that the …rms choosing to diversify would not increase their pro…ts by switching to a specialist strategy. Condition (5.2) assures that …rms choosing to specialize in market  would not increase their pro…ts by diversifying. This condition assures that …rms in market , who are in the more attractive market with less competition, do not want to diversify either. 6 Condition (5.3) assures when all …rms are diversi…ed it is not pro…table for
For our purposes, it does not matter whether the extra …rm is in market  or . 6 Given the symmetry of demand in the two markets, Lemma 5.2 focuses without loss of generality on the case where there are at least as many …rms specialized in market  as in market . on  such that specialized …rms do not want to diversify.
Main Results
We are now ready to state the main results on the level of diversi…cation. Results depend on whether diversi…cation increases competitiveness (  1) or decreases it (  1). With   1, the characterization is straightforward. (i) Higher levels of industry relatedness are associated with higher levels of diversi…cation.
(ii) There are regions of the parameter space where there are multiple equilibrium levels of diversi…cation. (iii) Firms diversify in pairs (except for the case of the …rst …rm to diversify when the total number of …rms is an odd number).
As in the case of   1, we have that increases in industry relatedness continue to be associated with increases in diversi…cation. However, while with   1 there is a unique equilibrium level of diversi…cation for every values of  and  (except at boundaries), we now have regions of the parameter space where there are multiple equilibrium levels of diversi…cation.
In addition, it is no longer the case that every level of diversi…cation can be supported in equi-libirum. Both of these di¤erences arise because the case of falling competitiveness introduces greater strategic interdependence.
With   1 diversi…cation by a rival …rm had a preemptive e¤ect and lowered the incentive of all other …rms to diversify. In contrast, when diversi…cation lowers competitiveness, a …rm's decision to diversify from market  into market  increases the incentive for …rms specialized in  to diversify into . Why? With   1, the average level of competitiveness of …rms active in market  is now lower, which increases the growth opportunity from entry into market  (i.e., higher ). Simultaneously, because the diversi…er's entry into market  makes that market less attractive,  specialists are more willing to diversify and su¤er the degradation of their competitiveness at home (i.e.,  is less negative). For both reasons, the incentive to diversify increases (i.e., higher  + ).
An implication of this kind of strategic interdependence is that …rms diversify in pairs, one from each industry. The exception is when no …rm has yet diversi…ed and there are an unequal number of …rms specialized in each market, in which case initial diversi…cation is pursued by a single …rm.
The increasing incentive to diversify when   1 explains the existence of multiple equilibria. Consider a pair of …rms. One possibility is that each …rm expects the other to diversify.
Another is that each …rm expects the other to specialize. Because a …rm's incentive to diversify (specialize) increases if its rival is expected to diversify (specialize), both sets of expectations can be self-ful…lling, which results in multiple equilibrium levels of diversi…cation. The possibility of multiple equilibria raises the issue of coordination among …rms in related industries.
The case of   1 is illustrated in Figure 5 . 
Diversi…cation and Pro…ts
When the number of diversi…ed …rms is …xed, greater industry relatedness increases the pro…ts of diversi…ed …rms while decreasing the pro…ts of specialized …rms, as shown in Proposition 3.1.
However, greater industry relatedness can also trigger an increase in the number of diversi…ed …rms, as shown in Section 5. Therefore, to fully characterize the e¤ect of relatedness on pro…ts, we need to characterize the e¤ect of increasing levels of diversi…cation on pro…ts. Diversi…cation impacts the pro…ts of other …rms in two ways. First, it increases the number of competitors in the target market. For …rms specialized in this market, this is the only e¤ect and they are necessarily worse o¤. The second impact comes from the changed competitiveness of the diversi…ed …rm. For …rms specialized in the home market of the diversi…er, this is the only e¤ect and their pro…ts decrease in the case of   1 and increase in the case of   1. 8 The e¤ect of additional diversi…cation on the pro…ts of existing diversi…ers incorporates both the impact of increased competition in the target market and the change in the new diversi…er's competitiveness. For   1, both e¤ects go in the same direction and existing diversi…ers are unambiguously worse o¤. For   1, the e¤ects go in opposite direction but the e¤ect of increased competition usually dominates so that the pro…ts of existing diversi…ers are still falling. 9 In summary, there are two e¤ects of increased relatedness. First, diversi…ers experience an increase in competitiveness and a decrease in …xed costs. Second, market structure deteriorates because more …rms choose to diversify and hence there are more …rms active in each market.
For specialized …rms, both e¤ects undermine pro…tability. For diversi…ed …rms, this raises an important question: does the deterioration in market structure o¤set the bene…ts of greater relatedness? The solid lines show the pro…ts of the diversi…ers, which are highly non-monotonic. Figure 6 .2 shows the relationship between pro…ts and relatedness for a case where  is low enough that diversi…cation occurs when   1. Here, because …rms diversify in pairs, there are only three possible equilibrium levels of diversi…cation ( ¤  = 0 2 4). Note that in both Figure   6 .1 and 6.2 there is a strong net negative impact on industry pro…ts as relatedness increases 8 In the case of   1, we know from Proposition 5.4 that diversi…cation happens in pairs. Hence even a …rm that bene…ts from the reduced competitiveness of a rival that diversi…es out of the home market will also face new competition from a …rm diversifying into the home market. This increase in competition can more than o¤set any gains in relative competitiveness for the remaining specialists such that pro…ts decline for all …rms. See Figure 6 .2 for an illustration. 9 The only case where the e¤ect of increased competition might not dominate is when  = 3 and there is one …rm of each type (i.e.,   =   =   = 1). 10 Note that when  ¤  = 1 there are two di¤erent levels of pro…ts for specialized …rms depending on whether they are in the market with one or two specialists. Our theory applies to diversi…cation across industries as well as to diversi…cation across market segments within an industry. For example, the move by the major auto manufacturers to expand across geographies (e.g., US, Europe, South America, Asia) and across product lines (e.g., light trucks, sport utility vehicles, luxury sedans) might correspond to increases in relatedness among the segments and, consistent with our theory, is associated with declining industry attractiveness due to increased rivalry.
We now consider the extent to which there is a clear prediction from the theory regarding the relative pro…tability of specialized and diversi…ed …rms. Note that in Figure 6 .2 there is no clear ordering of these pro…ts (i.e. the pro…ts of specialists may be greater or less than the pro…ts of diversi…ed …rms when  ¤  = 2, depending on the value of ). In contrast, in Figure   6 .1, where the values of  are all greater than 1, we have that the pro…ts of diversi…ed …rms are greater than those of specialized …rms for any given  ¤  . This is a general result when ¸1:
Proposition 6.3. Suppose that ¸1 and diversi…ed and specialized …rms coexist (i.e., 0   ¤   ). The pro…ts of diversi…ed …rms are strictly greater than the pro…ts of the specialized …rms with which they compete.
Our result that diversi…ers have higher pro…ts than specialists when ¸1 is related to the existence of positive pro…ts in IO models of entry with …xed costs (see, for example, Sutton, 1991) . In such models, the equilibrium level of entry is one where pro…ts are at least as great as the …xed cost of entry, but where they would fall below this level were an additional …rm to enter. This allows entrants to have positive pro…ts, which are greater than the zero pro…ts of non-entrants. In our model, diversi…ers correspond to the entrants and specialists correspond to the non-entrants.
A major di¤erence between our model and IO entry models is that we allow diversi…cation to a¤ect a …rm's competitiveness in its home market. When this e¤ect is negative, we show in Proposition 5.4 that …rms diversify in pairs. The diversifying …rms impose a negative externality on each other. This additional e¤ect, not present in traditional entry models, is what causes the pro…ts of diversi…ers to sometimes fall below those of specialists when   1.
Our results linking diversi…cation and pro…ts have implications for the existence of a diversi…cation discount or premium. An implication of Proposition 6.3 is that among …rms competing in a given industry pair, there is a diversi…cation premium as long as   1. On the other hand, when   1, one can get either a diversi…cation discount or premium. Somewhat counter intuitively, in our model a diversi…cation discount can only occur when the …xed costs of diversi…cation ( ) are low such that …rms diversify when   1.
Thus far we have focused on comparisons of specialists and diversi…ers within a given industry pair. What are the implications for cross sectional data that pool observations across many di¤erent industry pairs?
Simulated Cross-Sectional Data
We now present a simple exercise designed to explore how the linkages that we have identi…ed among industry relatedness, market structure, diversi…cation decisions, and pro…ts might impact empirical inferences about the relationship between diversi…cation and performance. To this end we generate cross-sectional data from the model and then consider the results generated by di¤erent regression speci…cations. The regressions have …rm pro…ts as the dependent variable and vary in the controls and interactions that they consider.
Data Generation
We construct the data set as follows. We consider …fty industry pairs that vary in their degree of relatedness. There are four …rms competing in each industry pair ( = 4). The restriction to  = 4 is to simplifying the coding of the data generation; the underlying theory holds for any number of …rms. For each industry pair, we generate the equilibrium scope strategies of the …rms and record the resulting pro…ts, output quantities, the degree of relatedness for the industry pair, and the …rm scope strategies themselves.
The range of industry-pair relatedness is determined as follows. From the theory, for any given level of …xed costs there is a lower bound on the level of competitiveness () required for at least one …rm to diversify, and an upper bound beyond which all …rms diversify. We set the value of …xed costs at  = 01 as in Figure 6 .1 and then identify the associated lower bound ( = 1044) and upper bound ( = 1173). We construct our sample to begin and end at  values so as to extend this range by 30% above and below these critical cuto¤s. 11 We make our observations at …fty levels of  uniformly distributed along this range (i.e.,  = 1005, 1010. . . , 1215, 1220). 12 In our setting, industries only vary along two dimensions: relatedness and market structure.
We do not include controls for the underlying attractiveness of a given industry since, by construction, all industries are the same in this regard (e.g. the same size parameter  and the same demand function). One can interpret this as a situation where the empiricist has e¤ectively controlled for di¤erences in the underlying industry attractiveness.
We construct a market structure variable using the weighted average of the Her…ndahl indexes corresponding to the industries in which a …rm competes. Speci…cally, the market structure variable associated with …rm  is
where   and   are the total output in each market and   and   are …rm 's output in each market. 13 Our data thus consist of pro…t levels (  ) for …rms pursuing strategies of diversi…cation (  = 1) and specialization (  = 0) in industries that vary in their level of relatedness (  ),
where relatedness varies in terms of its e¤ect on competitiveness rather than on …xed costs, and where we have used a weighted Her…ndahl index (  ) to capture the market structure of 11 We also constructed data sets with  ranges 10%, 20% and 40% above and below the critical cuto¤s. The qualitative results were robust in all cases. 12 For the level of …xed costs that we focus on, diversi…cation only occurs for values of   1. Hence, the construction of the data is simpli…ed by the fact that there is a unique equilibrium outcome (as long as one avoids boundaries), as highlighted in Proposition 5.3.
13 Firm outputs are taken from the Cournot model detailed in Appendix I. Table 7 .1: OLS regressions for …rm pro…ts using simulated data and the implied diversi…cation premium the industries in which a …rm competes. Figure 7 .1 plots the data. Note that diversi…ers always have higher pro…ts than specialists within a given industry pair (i.e., corresponding to a given level of relatedness). That is, there is a diversi…cation premium in the data.
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Constant 00705 07128 09178 ¡00946 01861 Diversi…cation (  ) ¡0286 00231 ¡03208 ¡00430 ¡05664 Relatedness (  ) ¡ ¡ 0604 ¡ ¡ ¡ Structure (  ) ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡   £   ¡ ¡ ¡04831 ¡ 01680 (1 ¡   ) £   ¡ ¡ ¡07967 ¡ ¡02275   £   ¡ ¡ ¡ 06102 07791 (1 ¡   ) £   ¡ ¡ ¡ 04093 03133  2 01588 07960 08366 9767 0990 Average Premium ¡286% 231% 233% 254% 263%
Data Analysis
We use OLS regression to examine the relationship between …rm pro…ts and diversi…cation status. We consider a series of increasingly well speci…ed models -well speci…ed with regards to the theory used to generate the data -to explore the e¤ects of omitted variables and interactions on the inferences that can be drawn. The results are reported in Table 1 .
In the baseline case, Model 1, we regress …rm pro…ts on diversi…cation status alone,
Diversi…cation is found to have a negative e¤ect on pro…ts, with an average diversi…cation discount of 286%. With only one degree of freedom, the …t to the data is low ( 2 = 0159), despite the absence of noise in the data. Figure 7 .2 plots the predicted pro…ts of diversi…ed and specialized …rms against the data.
We know that the …nding of a diversi…cation discount is spurious and does not correspond to the underlying process that generated the data. The problem is not that diversi…cation per se lowers performance but that diversi…ers tend to be in more related industry pairs and face higher levels of competition. 
Diversi…cation is now found to have a positive e¤ect on pro…ts, with a diversi…cation premium of 231%. Relatedness is found to have a strongly negative e¤ect on pro…ts ( 2 = ¡0604). The …t to the data is much higher ( 2 = 0796). Figure 7 .3 plots the predicted pro…ts of diversi…ed and specialized …rms against the data. With the control for relatedness, the regression uncovers the underlying diversi…cation premium. This speci…cation, however, overlooks the fact that relatedness should have a di¤erential impact on the performance of diversi…ers and specialists.
Model 3 adds an interaction between relatedness and diversi…cation status:
The diversi…cation premium increases to 281%. 14 Relatedness is found to have a strongly negative e¤ects on the pro…ts of all …rms, and the e¤ect is more negative for specialists ( 3 = ¡0797) than for diversi…ers ( 2 = ¡0483). The …t to the data increases marginally ( 2 = 0837). Figure 7 .4 plots the predicted pro…ts. The reason for the negative e¤ect of relatedness on the pro…ts of diversi…ed …rms is that relatedness captures both the increasing competitiveness of diversi…ed …rms and the erosion of market structure that comes from increased levels of diversi…cation.
Model 5 presents a complete speci…cation in which the concentration measure is interacted with diversi…cation status:
There is a diversi…cation premium of 263%. 15 The e¤ect of relatedness is now positive for diversi…ers ( 2 = 0168) and negative for specialists ( 3 = ¡0228). The e¤ect of market concentration is strongly positive for both diversi…ers ( 4 = 0780) and for specialists ( 5 =
14 Given the interaction term we calculate the diversi…cation premium as
is the average relatedness in the data set. 15 We calculate the diversi…cation premium as
 where ¹  = 1097 and ¹  = 0341 is the average weighted Her…ndahl in the data set. 0313). The …t is now almost perfect ( 2 = 0990). Figure 7 .5 plots the predicted pro…ts.
The …nal exercise is to consider the inferences when the empiricist can observe concentration but not relatedness, which leads to Model 4:
There is a diversi…cation premium of 254%. 16 . The e¤ect of market concentration is strongly positive for both diversi…ers ( 2 = 0610) and for specialists ( 3 = 0410). The …t is very high ( 2 = 0980). Figure 7 .6 plots the predicted pro…ts. Note that the …tted lines vary with relatedness even though it is not controlled for, because concentration varies with relatedness. Controls for either market relatedness or market structure are su¢cient to uncover the underlying diversi…cation premium in this data. 17 There are two ways to interpret the models with omitted variables. The …rst is that the variable is literally omitted and the second, is that the operationalization of the variable does not correspond to the underlying theoretical construct. The operationalization of relatedness and market structure in empirical studies has proven to be challenging and has generated considerable debate.
Rumelt's (1974) original measures of relatedness relied on a partially subjective characterization of the potential for shared activities and resources across businesses given the industries in which the …rm competes. Subsequent authors sought to develop less subjective and more systematic measures by using Standard Industry Classi…cation (SIC) codes for a …rm's industries to construct concentric-based (e.g., Montgomery and Wernerfelt, 1988) and entropy-based (e.g., Davis and Duhaime, 1992) measures of relatedness. SIC codes, however, have been criticized as not corresponding to the possibilities for sharing activities and resources (Rumelt, 1982; Wiersema, 1995, 2003; Villalonga, 2004a) . More recent approaches include using technology ‡ows across markets (Robins and Wiersema, 1995; Bowen and Wiersema, 2005) , patent citations (Kim and Kogut, 1996) , and the actual patterns of diversi…cation (Teece et. al., 1994; Bryce and Winter, 2004 ) to measure relatedness. However a consensus 16 We calculate the diversi…cation premium as  1 + ( 2 ¡  3 ) ¹  where ¹  = 0341. 17 We also ran variations on models 4 and 5 in which the variable   is included in the speci…cation but not interacted with . In both cases, there is a diversi…cation premium and a marginal decline in the  2 .
does not yet seem to have emerged.
Market structure has been operationalized using the standard concentration measures such as the Her…ndahl index. Since these measures are usually constructed using data based on SIC codes, they are subject to similar critiques as SIC-based relatedness measures. Bryce and Winter (2004:19) , for example, note that although most analysts would agree that the "Paving Mixtures and Blocks" industry and the "Concrete, Ready-Mixed" industry are highly related, the SIC coding structure treats them as highly unrelated, assigning them to di¤erent single-digit classi…cations.
The simple exercise in this section elucidates some of what is at stake in the e¤orts to develop e¤ective control variables. For example, comparing Model 3 and Model 5 shows that the lack of e¤ective controls for market structure can bias downward estimates on the e¤ects of relatedness on performance.
Conclusion
We address two key debates in the extensive empirical literature on corporate diversi…cation:
the existence of a diversi…cation discount and the relative importance of relatedness and market structure for the performance of diversi…ed …rms. We develop a formal theory in which the decision to diversify is endogenous and a¤ects the both market structure and …rms' competitiveness. Our key exogenous variable is the extent of industry relatedness.
We decompose the decision to diversify into three key components -the …xed costs of entry, the growth opportunity and the e¤ect on home-market competitiveness -that all depend on the degree of industry relatedness. Although we start with homogeneous …rms, heterogeneity naturally emerges as …rms make di¤erent diversi…cation decisions due to decreasing returns.
As more …rms diversify, the increased number of rivals in each industry reduce the growth opportunities available to additional diversi…ers. This emergent heterogeneity in …rm scope strategies leads to heterogeneity in market shares and pro…ts.
Market structure depends on the relative number of …rms that choose to specialize versus the number that choose to diversify and compete in multiple industries. Because these diversi…cation decisions depend on the level of relatedness, we …nd that relatedness and market structure are not distinct constructs in our theory. Within our formal model we make precise the negative impacts of relatedness on market structure.
We …nd a non-monotonic e¤ect of relatedness on the performance of diversi…ed …rms.
Although greater relatedness increases the competitiveness of diversi…ed …rms, it can also spur additional diversi…cation and thereby erode market structure and performance. As we show in the data simulation, overlooking these e¤ects in empirical speci…cations can give rise to spurious inferences of a diversi…cation discount. The emerging literature on the formal foundations of strategy has tended to emphasize business-level rather than corporate-level issues. In this paper, we have sought to expand the scope of inquiry.
Like any model, ours contains many simplifying assumptions such as there being only two, symmetric markets and initially homogeneous …rms. Our objective, however, is not to reproduce reality, but rather to elucidate some of the drivers of diversi…cation patterns that one might see in real markets. Nonetheless, relaxing some of the simplifying assumptions could form the basis of future research. The simplicity of our model, especially when specialized to  = 2, 3 or 4 …rms, suggests that it could serve as a tractable platform.
Given the importance of resource heterogeneity in the literature, a natural extension would be to endow some …rms in our model with valuable resources. One could then explore whether resourced or unresourced …rms have a greater incentive to diversify and how the speci…city of the resources a¤ects these incentives. By considering more than two markets, one could address the extent to which a …rm has diversi…ed and possibly elucidate the construction of measures of relatedness in a …rm's portfolio of businesses. Finally, one could endogenize the number of …rms in order to address entry and exit dynamics, possibly involving merger and acquisition activity.
We begin by formally de…ning   , the index of …rm 's value creation in market . Each …rm  has a constant marginal cost of production in market  given by  ¸0 . There is a continuum of consumers in market  that have a willingness to pay for …rm 's product given by   ¡ . While the   can vary across products but are the same for all consumers, the  are the same for all products but vary across consumers. In particular,  is uniformly distributed with density  between 0 and some arbitrarily large upper bound. The assumption of a uniform distribution generates linear demand for each …rm with an intercept of   and a slope of 1. We then de…ne   =   ¡   . This is an index of marginal value creation; the actual marginal value creation varies across consumers according to   ¡   ¡ .
With Cournot competition, each of the  …rms that have entered market  choose an output  ¸0 . Prices are such that markets clear, which in our context yields the price   =   ¡ P  =1    for …rm  in market . Firms seek to maximize their pro…ts from the market, which are   = (  ¡   )  . At an interior equilibrium where    0 for all , we have that the …rst order conditions
are satis…ed for all . Note we can substitute   =   ¡   into (9.1). There is then a unique Nash equilibrium satisfying these conditions given by
which establishes the Cournot pro…t expression (2.2). The textbook Cournot model with homogenous products (e.g. Tirole, 1988) is a special case of this model with   =  so that
The generalization of the Cournot model that we are using has been used in the IO literature to study network externalities (Katz and Shapiro, 1985) and disruptive technologies (Adner and Zemsky, 2005) . For a more extensive and general treatment of Cournot competition with di¤erentiated products see Vives (1999) .
For (2.2) to hold, we need to restrict  such that …rm outputs  ¤  and pro…ts are positive for all values of ,   ,   and   . For specialized …rms to have positive output, it must be that   +   (  ¡   )  0 which we can rewrite as
Substituting  =     and setting   =  ¡ 1, which minimizes (  + 1)  subject to their being at least one specialized …rm, yields the following upper bound on    ¡ 1  .
For diversi…ed …rms to have positive output in both markets it must be that   +¹   (  ¡  )  0 where ¹   = maxf     g, which we can rewrite as
We want to …nd the highest value for ¹   (¹   + 1) subject to    0. If  is odd, then the highest value occurs at ¹   = ( ¡ 1)2 which yields
while if  is even the highest value occurs at ¹   = ( + 1)2 which yields
Noting that ( + 1)( + 3)  ( ¡ 1)( + 1), we have that expression (2.1) is su¢cient to guarantee that …rm outputs are positive and that (2.2) holds. A possible limitation of Cournot models is that the choice variables (quantities) are strategic substitutes rather than strategic complements. In other plausible models of competition, especially when …rms choose prices, choice variables are strategic complements. Such quantity competition in the second stage can drive results in two-stage models because it means that …rms want to take aggressive actions in the …rst stage in order to commit themselves to high output levels; see for example the literature on strategic incentives (Fershtman and Judd 1987). However, our theory of diversi…cation is not fundamentally driven by the desire of …rms to commit to aggressive actions and hence we do not expect that the assumption of quantity rather than price competition is an important driver of the results.
Appendix II: Proofs
Proof of Lemmas 5.1 and 5.2
Necessary and su¢cient conditions for (  ,   ,   ) to constitute a pure strategy Nash equilibrium are that no …rm has a pro…table deviation:
where one drops any condition where there are no …rms pursuing the strategy, e.g. if   = 0 then condition (10.1) does not apply. Suppose we have      + 1. Note that the pro…ts of specialized …rms are falling in the number of other specialized …rms. This and the symmetry in the two markets implies that
, which contradicts this being a PSNE. Similarly, we can not have      + 1. This establishes Lemma 5. 1 We henceforth restrict attention to j  ¡   j · 1, which assures that We now restate formally Proposition 5.3 and Proposition 5.4 as well as introducing a new proposition for the case of  = 1, which we include for completeness. We then prove these propositions.
 is an equilibrium overlaps non trivially with the interval 
Proof of Propositions 5.3, 5.4 and 10.1 Based on Lemma 5.1 and the symmetry of the markets, when considering any equilibrium level of diversi…cation we can restrict attention to   2 f     + 1g. The …rst step in the proof is to de…ne a couple of critical  values. Condition (5.1), which is a necessary condition for any   satisfying 0    ·  to be an equilibrium, can be rewritten as
Condition (5.2), which is a necessary condition for any   satisfying 0 ·     to be an equilibrium, can be rewritten as
Next we establish two lemmas about properties of these critical  values. We have that   is a continuous, increasing function of  and above we showed that    0 for  = 1 and 1 ·  · . Hence, for  su¢ciently close to 1 we also have    0 for 1 ·  · . This establishes part (iii) of Proposition 5.4. Q.E.D.
